William & Mary Law Review
Volume 34 (1992-1993)
Issue 4 Symposium: The Restatement of
Suretyship

Article 3

May 1993

History and Background of the Restatement of Suretyship
Donald J. Rapson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Repository Citation
Donald J. Rapson, History and Background of the Restatement of Suretyship, 34 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 989 (1993), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/3
Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE
RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP
DONALD
I.

J. RAPSON*

INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Third) of Suretyship1 has been a remarkable
project in that people from two diverse groups,2 with different perspectives and disciplines, have worked together to produce a product that will not only be academically sound, but will also have
great utility in practice. At the same time, within each of these two
groups, the project reflects the cooperative efforts of people who
have known and worked with one another for many years and have
jointly contributed their intellect and expertise for the purpose of
producing a work of great importance. This Article recounts the
history and background of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship
and, with some hesitation, also recalls my personal involvement
with the project.
Primary credit for the development of the Restatement of Suretyship must be given to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,3 Direc* Senior Vice President, Assistant General Counsel and Secretary, The CIT Group, Inc.,
Livingston, New Jersey; Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University Law School; Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law School; Member, Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code; Member, Drafting Committees for Articles 3, 4, 4A, 6, and 9; Member,
Board of Advisers, Restatement (Third) of Suretyship.
1. All references to the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship are to Tentative Draft No. 1
(Mar. 23, 1992), as modified and supplemented by Tentative Draft No. 2 (Apr. 2, 1993).
2. One group is composed of attorneys who regularly represent commercial lenders and
are accustomed to drafting comprehensive guaranty and credit enhancement agreements
upon which their clients place great reliance. The second group is made up of attorneys
from the "suretyship industry" who regularly represent the issuers of payment bonds, performance bonds, fidelity bonds, and the like. See infra text accompanying notes 9-16. These
two groups, together with several academics, comprise the Advisers to the Restatement of
Suretyship.
3. Professor Hazard and I were classmates at Columbia Law School. More recently, we
have worked together on the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
There are other significant Columbia Law School connections in this project. Professor E.
Allan Farnsworth, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,which contains
many provisions dealing with suretyship, is an essential Adviser to the Restatement of
Suretyship.
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tor of the American Law Institute (ALI) and Chairman of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
(Board). Following a discussion at a meeting of the Board, I wrote
to Professor Hazard on May 30, 1986, "recommending an ALI
study of the law of suretyship with a view to (1) having a Restatement of the Law of Security 2d and (2) reviewing and expanding
the suretyship rules in the Uniform Commercial Code-possibly in
a new Article."'4 The first reference was to the common law of suretyship as presently set forth as Division II of the Restatement of
Security,5 which was published in 1941.6
This recommendation involved some personal nostalgia. Professor John Hanna of Columbia Law School was the Reporter for the
Restatement of Security Years later, from 1952-1955, he was the
Consultant on Article 9 for the New York Law Revision Commission in its monumental study of the then-proposed Uniform Commercial Code.7 As his student research assistant on that project, I
came to know him very well. Professor Hanna was an outstanding
authority on commercial law and authored a number of texts, including his Cases and Materials on Securitya which, in effect,
serves as a supplement to the Restatement of Security I owe
much of my background in commercial law to Professor Hanna

4. Letter from Donald J. Rapson, General Counsel, C.I.T. Corp., to Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Professor, Yale Law School 1 (May 30, 1986) (on file with author). See infra Appendix A
for the full text of this letter.
5. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 82-211 (1941). Division I deals with pledges which, of
course, are presently covered in large part by Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
6. In May 1990, Professor Neil B. Cohen of Brooklyn Law School, who later became Reporter for the Restatement of Suretyship, provided a preliminary report in which he noted
that "the Restatement of Security has been the second least cited Restatement, having been
cited only 963 times from its promulgation through April 1, 1989." Neil B. Cohen, Preliminary Report on a Restatement of Suretyship: A Report to the Director of the American Law
Institute 6 (May 1990) (on file with author).
7. See NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE

2007.

8. JOHN HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY (2d ed. 1940). Here, the Columbia
Law School connection again appears. Howard Ruda is a nationally known authority on

commercial lending and Editor-in-Chief of ASSET BASED

FINANCING:

A

TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE

(1993). While a student at Columbia, he served as Professor Hanna's research assistant on
the 1954 edition of the casebook. Mr. Ruda, who was my colleague at The CIT Group during
the mid-1980s, is an Adviser to the Restatement of Suretyship and an important contributor to the analyses of the commercial law issues.

1993]

HISTORY OF THE RESTATEMENT

and was very gratified to have the opportunity to refocus on his
work.

II.

THE

"Two

WORLDS" OF SURETYSHIP

My perspective in recommending an ALI study of the law of
suretyship to Professor Hazard was essentially that of a commercial lending lawyer concentrating on guaranties, recourse arrangements, and other "credit enhancement" devices. Professor Hazard
fortunately recognized, however, that another constituency with at
least an equal interest and involvement in the subject had to be
consulted and involved, namely the "suretyship industry," which
issues contract bonds such as payment bonds, performance bonds,
fidelity bonds, financial guaranty bonds, and the like.
This industry is a well-represented and active participant in the
Fidelity and Surety Law Committee (FSLC) of the Tort and Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) of the American Bar Association.
Professor Hazard contacted Hugh D. Reynolds, Jr. of Indianapolis,
an authority in the field of suretyship and a past Chairman of
FSLC, in order to ascertain the views and interests of that committee with respect to the proposed new Restatement. The response
was very positive and Andrew C. Hecker, Jr. of Philadelphia,
Chairman of TIPS, and James A. Black, Jr. of Baltimore, 9 the new
Chairman of FSLC, indicated their willingness to provide assistance and support for the project.
At that point, Daniel Mungall, Jr. of Philadelphia, also a former
Chairman and member of FSLC, agreed to act as liaison with the
ALI for the purpose of pursuing and participating in the proposed
Restatement of Suretyship. Mr. Mungall is a recognized authority
on suretyship law who has written extensively on the subrogation
rights of the contract bond surety 10 As matters developed, he
eventually became the Associate Reporter for the Restatement.
Professor Hazard then organized a preliminary meeting of representatives from the commercial lending and suretyship industry

9. Hugh Reynolds and James Black later became Advisers to the Restatement of
Suretyship.
10. E.g., Daniel Mungall, Jr., The Subrogation Rights of the Contract Bond Surety, 1990
ABA Annual Meeting, Fidelity & Surety Committee (Aug. 7, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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groups, as well as a number of academic authorities such as Professor Peter A. Alces, who at Professor Hazard's request had prepared
a memorandum discussing the suretyship issues that arise in commercial transactions." The meeting was held on July 18, 1989 at
Mr. Mungall's offices.
Various materials were submitted for consideration at this meeting. Among them was a topical outline or checklist entitled "Main
Topics - Suretyship, '12 which FSLC had been developing for a
number of years and which compiled and organized the important
topics and issues from the perspective of the contract bond suretyship industry and its attorneys.' 3 In addition, at Professor Hazard's request, I prepared a memorandum outlining the scope and
major issues concerning commercial financing that might be considered in the proposed Restatement, which, in essence, served as
4
the mechanism for eliciting discussion at the meeting.
This meeting of the two groups was fascinating. Although everyone attending was either a practicing commercial lawyer or an active commercial law teacher, the contrasts between the commercial
lending and suretyship industry groups was remarkable in terms of
background and emphasis. The discussion reflected the complexity
of the task ahead in delineating rules of law under the general rubric of "suretyship" that would be acceptable to both groups. Professor Steven L. Harris, in evaluating the substantive views expressed at the meeting, wrote:
All agree that the Restatement should cover suretyship transactions; however, they disagree over precisely what constitutes
suretyship. As was clear from the materials circulated in advance of the July 18 meeting, "suretyship" encompasses at least
two different legal worlds. First is the world of the professional
surety, for whom the prototypical transaction is a construction
11. Memorandum from Peter A. Alces to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director,
American Law Institute (May 3, 1989) (on file with author).
12. A copy of this outline is on file with author.
13. In 1982, Mr. Mungall appointed Bernard L. Balkin, Esq. of Kansas City, Missouri,
chairman of a committee to develop an outline providing categories into which the attorneys
practicing in the suretyship industry could readily file the many articles, memoranda, cases,
and other materials on that subject. FLSC maintains a library of fidelity and surety papers
at Mr. Mungall's firm, Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young of Philadelphia.
14. Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson, Why a Restatement of Suretyship is Needed
(May 30, 1989) (on file with author). See infra Appendix B for a copy of this memorandum.

19931

HISTORY OF THE RESTATEMENT

bond. Second is the world of the commercial lender, for whom
the prototypical transaction is a commercial guarantee. 15
The meeting demonstrated the desire of all concerned to proceed
with the project and concluded with a general consensus that a
preliminary report or prospectus for the Restatement should be
prepared and a Reporter appointed.1 6 In time, Professor Neil B.
Cohen became the Reporter and the first formal meeting of the
Reporters and Advisers was held in Philadelphia at the American
Law Institute on June 29, 1990.

III.

REEXAMINING SURETYSHIP LAW. LANGEVELD v

L.R.Z.H. CORP

The organizational background of the Restatement of Suretyship having been recounted, it may be useful to explore the circumstances that led me to write to Professor Hazard on May 30,
1986 recommending the project. These recollections are, perhaps, a
microcosm of the experiences other attorneys have had in explain15. Memorandum from Steven L. Harris to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. 1 (Aug. 22, 1989) (on
file with author). Professor Harris was one of several academic authorities in attendance. He
later became Co-Reporter for the Article 9 Study Group of the Board. His views were
echoed by Dennis B. Arnold, of Los Angeles, in a letter dated July 20, 1989: "Quite frankly,
I found much of the discussion to be quite fascinating, particularly the rather remarkable
differences between the 'TIPS-group' and those of us who have a commercial law focus."
Letter from Dennis B. Arnold to Donald J. Rapson, Esq. 2 (July 20, 1989) (on file with
author). Mr. Arnold, who is an Adviser to the Restatement of Suretyship, has lectured and
written extensively on suretyship law of California, which is one of the few states having a
comprehensive statutory scheme. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2787-2854 (West 1974). This theme
of "two Vworlds of suretyship" was later reflected in Professor Cohen's preliminary report:
It often appears that the world of suretyship consists of two wholly distinct
worlds. On one hand is the world of credit enhancement, where decisions to
extend credit are induced by the agreement of a solvent party to assume the
risk of non-payment associated with the extension of credit to the debtor. In
this world, the underlying obligation is the payment of money and the instrument effectuating the suretyship is, in substance, a payment guarantee. In the
world of construction contracts, on the other hand, decisions to retain a contractor or subcontractor are induced by the agreement of a solvent party to
stand behind the principal's obligation to perform. In this world, the underlying obligation is not payment but performance; while the surety may eventually fulfill its duties by paying money, that payment is, typically, more in the
nature of damages that [sic] it is contracted-for performance.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 10.
16. Memorandum from T. Scott Leo, Notes of Restatement Meeting Held on July 18,
1989, at 5-6 (on file with author). T. Scott Leo is a Chicago attorney and an Adviser to the
Restatement.
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ing how and why a need developed for a review and revision of
suretyship law
In 1974, I was retained to handle the appeal by the guarantor in
Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp.17 from the grant of a summary judgment in favor of the creditor. 18 This case became somewhat of a
landmark, appearing in numerous casebooks and treatises."9 Several complex questions of law were involved which necessitated indepth research and analysis into hoary doctrines of suretyship law
It is instructive now to revisit the holding of the New Jersey Supreme Court and then explore the impact, if any, of the changes in
suretyship law reflected by the recent revisions to Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code 20 and the provisions of the proposed
Restatement of Suretyship.
A.

The Facts of Langeveld

The case involved a suit by Langeveld, the payee of a negotiable
promissory note in the amount of $57,500 against L.R.Z.H. Corporation, the maker, and Higgins, a guarantor.2 1 The guaranty was
appended to the foot of the note, thereby making the guarantor an
accommodation party 22 As a result, the rights of the parties were
governed by former Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 3
The obligation of L.R.Z.H. to Langeveld was secured by a third
mortgage.2 4 The first mortgage was to a savings institution in the
amount of $825,000 and the second mortgage was to an individual
for approximately $58,000; both mortgages were properly recorded.2 5 Higgins' guaranty was unconditional.2 The note was not
paid on its maturity date, at which time it was discovered that the

17. 327 A.2d 683 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 350 A.2d 76 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 376 A.2d 931 (N.J. 1977).
18. Id. at 686.
19. See, e.g., VERN COUNTRYMAN ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 549
(1982).
20. See U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990).
21. Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 684.
22. Id.
23. U.C.C. § 3-415 (1978) (replaced by U.C.C. § 3-419 (1990)). If the guaranty had been in
a separate document, the common law of suretyship would have governed the case and Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code would have been inapplicable.
24. Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 684.
25. Id.
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Langeveld mortgage had not been recorded.
The guarantor
brought this to the attention of Langeveld, who then recorded the
mortgage; by this time, however, it was now also subordinate to
another recorded mortgage for $100,000 and two mechanic's lien
claims in the respective amounts of approximately $112,000 and
$13,000.28 In other words, the Langeveld mortgage, which was executed and delivered as a third mortgage, was now in sixth place.
Shortly thereafter, L.R.Z.H. defaulted on all of the mortgages,
and the holder of the fourth mortgage commenced foreclosure proceedings resulting in a final judgment which fixed the amounts due
the respective mortgagees and their priorities. 29 Approximately
eighteen months later, a sheriff's sale was held and Higgins (acting
through a corporation) purchased the property for $1,080,000.30 By
reason of the accrual of interest on the first mortgage, however, the
bid amount, although fully satisfying the first mortgage, left only
$20,000 to apply to the second mortgage. 3 1 Thus, a deficiency remained on the second mortgage and nothing, of course, was left for
the subsequent mortgages and lien claims.

26. Id. Actually, the guaranty did not use the word "unconditional." However, the guaranty stated that the guarantor was "principally liable" and contained a waiver of "presentment, demand for payment, protest and notice of protest." Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376
A.2d 931, 935 n.4 (N.J. 1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court later noted that the waiver
language was superfluous because the waiver was automatically afforded by former U.C.C.
§ 3-416(5) by reason of the "words of guaranty." Id. at 935. Both the trial court and the
New Jersey Supreme Court treated the guaranty as unconditional, the latter stating:
We think the wording of this guaranty may be fairly equated with language
purporting to make a person in defendant's position an "unconditional guarantor." Such language is normally held to permit the creditor to move against the
guarantor without first proceeding against the principal debtor or the collateral. It is not customarily interpreted as providing a guarantor with any further
rights.
Id.
27. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 933.
28. Id.
29. Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 684.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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The Suretyship Defense of "Impairment of Collateral"

Higgins, the guarantor, claimed that he was discharged under
former section 3-606(1)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code,3 2
which in pertinent part read:
Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the
extent that without such party's consent the holder
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any
per3
son against whom he has a right of recourse. 1
Langeveld disputed Higgins' position on two grounds:
He urge[d], first, that the guaranty [was] unconditional in form
and that this being so, the alleged impairment of collateral in no
way affect[ed] the obligation to which the guaranty g[ave] rise.
In the second place he contend[ed] that there ha[d] in fact been
no impairment of collateral, or at least none that ha[d] caused
defendant to suffer loss."
The trial court had held that the unconditional nature of the
guaranty did not deprive the guarantor of the right to assert the
"impairment of collateral" defense afforded by former section
3-606(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code.35 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this holding,36 so the critical issue on appeal
became whether there had been an "impairment of collateral"
37
within the purview of former section 3-606(1).
32. Id.
33. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(b) (1978).
34. Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376 A.2d 931, 934 (N.J. 1977).
35. Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 683. In doing so, the trial court rejected a line of pre-U.C.C.
cases holding to the contrary. E.g., Bank of New Jersey v. Heine, 464 F.2d 1161 (3d Cir.
1972); Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196
(10th Cir. 1957). The New Jersey Supreme Court later agreed, stating that the impairmentof-collateral defense is only lost "where the instrument of guaranty specifically frees the
creditor from liability for such impairment," and held that an unconditional guaranty does
not constitute such an "unequivocal waiver." Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 935. Almost all subsequent cases agree on this point. E.g., United States v. Vahlco Corp., 800 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1986).
36. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 935-36.
37. Id. at 934.
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The trial court had properly recognized that the impairment-ofcollateral defense derived from the right of the surety or guarantor
to be subrogated to the collateral given by the principal debtor to
the creditor, i.e., the mortgage from L.R.Z.H. to Langeveld, and
that "the failure to record a security instrument such as a mortgage discharged the surety or guarantor to the extent that his right
of subrogation to the collateral was diminished or his risk of loss
was unreasonably increased."38 The court then went astray, however, when it held that the delay in recording the Langeveld mortgage "occasioned no loss in priority of the mortgage and cannot be
said to have impaired the value of the mortgage as collateral nor to
have diminished [Higgins'] right of subrogation to the collateral"
because "[tlhe foreclosure sale result established conclusively that
plaintiff's mortgage had no value in fact, and plaintiff's conduct
did not cause any loss to the defendant so as to effect either a
39
limited or total discharge under § 3-606."
C.

When Is "Impairment of Collateral" Determined?

The trial court in Langeveld looked to the amounts due on the
first two mortgages at the time of the sheriff's sale in determining
whether the guarantor's right of subrogation to the collateral had
been impaired. The trial court was persuaded that the accrual of
interest on those two mortgages during the eighteen-month period
following the default on the Langeveld mortgage-which was supposed to be the third mortgage-meant that the proceeds of the
sheriff's sale were necessarily insufficient to leave any money available for the payment of a third mortgage, thereby precluding any
possibility of prejudice to the guarantor.40

38. Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 685.
39. Id. at 686. In so holding, the trial court was, in effect, taking the position that the
$1,080,000 purchase price represented the fair market value of the property. The New
Jersey Supreme Court later made note of that point. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936. Although a
rational finding, this is not necessarily always the fact. The successful bid at a foreclosure
sale is usually an amount that the bidder believes is less than or equal to the fair market
value of the property. The bidder will generally commence its bidding at some amount below fair market value. If no one raises the bid, the successful bidder will have no reason to
raise its own bid to the full fair market value.
40. See Langeveld, 327 A.2d at 686.
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In taking the appeal, my view was that the trial court had made
a fundamental error in looking at the time of the sheriff's sale to
value the property; it should have looked at the date eighteen
months earlier when L.R.Z.H. defaulted on the Langeveld mortgage. It was at that time that Higgins first could have exercised his
right of subrogation to the supposed third mortgage by paying off
the debt. The critical inquiry should have been: if the Langeveld
mortgage had been timely recorded so that Higgins then could
have been subrogated to that mortgage with a third-priority position and then foreclosed that mortgage, would there have been any
value in the property over and above the first two mortgages sufficient to satisfy or apply to that third mortgage9 4'
The Appellate Division was not at all impressed with this argument and affirmed in a per curiam opinion "essentially for the reasons stated" by the trial court.4 2 Thus, the stage was set for the
appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. As matters turned out,
that court unequivocally adopted the guarantor's position:
In the first place, and most importantly, the factual situation
and the respective rights and obligations of the parties should
have been assessed and determined not at the time of the sheriff's sale, in August, 1974, but rather at the time the obligation
matured, in February, 1973. It was then that defendant was entitled to exercise his rights as surety. Had he paid plaintiff the
amount then due-57,500, together with interest at the rate of
10% from October 15, 1970-he would have stood in plaintiff's
shoes as holder of the note and mortgage. Had the mortgage
originally been promptly recorded, as it should have been, there
would then have been available to him a variety of options, the
relative merits of which we are in no position to evaluate at this
time and on this record. For instance, as holder of a junior lien
(the Langeveld mortgage) he would have had a right to redeem
either or both The Howard Savings and Castellane mortgages.
He could have foreclosed any mortgage acquired. Other possibilities suggest themselves. The point is that defendant ap41. Of necessity, this analysis assumed that Higgins then would have either paid off or
assumed and reinstated the first two mortgages before proceeding, as subrogee, to foreclose
the third mortgage. Keeping in mind that he paid $1,080,000 at the sheriff's sale eighteen
months later, see id. at 684, such an assumption was neither unrealistic nor speculative.
42. Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 350 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 376
A.2d 931 (N.J. 1977).
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pears to have been deprived of the opportunity effectively to exploit his right of subrogation to unimpaired collateral by the
failure of plaintiff to record the mortgage given him by L.R.Z.H.
Corporation.4 3
D

How Is "Impairment of Collateral" Measured?

The appeal also raised an important related issue. If, as the New
Jersey Supreme Court held, the facts "should have
been assayed to determine their effect, if any, with respect to the alleged
impairment of collateral" 44 when the obligation matured, how, as a
matter of proof, would this impairment be established? And, if
"impairment of collateral" was, as is most likely, an affirmative defense with the burden of proof falling on the guarantor, with what
specificity would that burden have to be met? This was a particularly troubling inquiry, because its focal point was "what if?"-.e.,
what would have been the result if the Langeveld mortgage had
been timely recorded so as to attain a third-priority position? 45
Should this burden fall upon guarantor 9 After all, the creditor
caused the problem by failing to record the mortgage. Why should
the guarantor not be entitled to an automatic discharge for the
debt under the doctrine of strictissimijuris or, at the very least, be
entitled to the benefit of a presumption that it suffered a loss
equal to the amount of the debt, which the creditor would have the
right to rebut? 46 The New Jersey Supreme Court framed the issue
in this fashion:
The parties express sharply differing views as to the extent to
which an impairment of collateral should be held to discharge
one secondarily liable. Defendant suggests that the Code has
adopted the rule, sometimes referred to as that of strictissimi
juris, that a surety is completely discharged by any impairment
43. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936 (citation omitted).
44. Id.
45. See supra text accompanying note 41.
46. This would be directly analogous to the so-called "rebuttable presumption" or "shift"
rule in which a creditor who fails to comply with Part 5 of Article 9 of the U.C.C. (governing
default) must overcome the presumption that a commercially reasonable sale would have
realized an amount equal to the amount of the debt. See, e.g., In re Excello Press, Inc., 890
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1989); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32 (Conn.
1988).
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of collateral, whether or not he has sustained loss or prejudice.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the surety should
calculaonly be released from liability to the extent that actual,
47
ble monetary loss can be shown to have occurred.
It then, however, enunciated a somewhat amorphous rule:
We think the statute should be read as adopting a rule somewhere between these extremes. If the impairment of collateral
can be measured in monetary terms, then the calculated amount
of the impairment will ordinarily measure the extent of the
surety's discharge. But there are factual situations-this may or
may not be one of them-where a surety may be able to establish that he has sustained prejudice, but be unable to measure
the extent of the prejudice in terms of monetary loss. Where
such a situation is 48presented the surety will normally be completely discharged.

The supreme court then remanded the case to the trial court, instructing it to
determine from all of the evidence presented, to what extent, if
at all, plaintiffs failure seasonably to record his mortgage impaired the collateral given by L.R.Z.H. Corporation to plaintiff
as security for the indebtedness. The effect of the impairment
upon one secondarily liable may or may not be translatable into
dollars. There may be clear prejudice without precisely calculable loss. This will normally result in the discharge of the surety.
HigTo the extent that such impairment is found, defendant,
49
gins will stand discharged of his obligation as guarantor.
These instructions provided both parties and the trial judge with a
dilemma as to what exactly was supposed to happen on remand. As
a consequence of this uncertainty, with the enthusiastic urging of
the trial judge, the parties eventually settled.50
47. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936-37.
48. Id. at 937.
49. Id.
50. Judge Conford's concurring opinion in the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision anticipated the problem and took the position that the guarantor had conclusively established
prejudice and was entitled to summary judgment without the necessity of a remand.
Since it is impossible to rerun the course of events and discover to a certainty what defendant, as surety, would have done at maturity of the note if
the Langeveld mortgage had been recorded immediately upon execution,
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In dealing with this point, the guarantor had the problem of explaining the meaning of the words "to the extent" in former section 3-606(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 1 Do these words
merely mean "if' in terms of a condition or do they require a
quantitative analysis of the dollar amount of the impairment? Put
differently, was the failure timely to record the mortgage an impairment per se entitling the surety to a discharge without establishing more, or must the surety prove the amount of damages
proximately caused by that failure?
IV

EXAMINING THE COMMON LAW OF SURETYSHIP

The attempt to find an answer to this question necessitated an
examination of the common law of suretyship, 2 including its formulation in Division II of the Restatement of Security 53 That examination proved to be someWhat bewildering and unsettling, and,
in retrospect, was a critical factor leading to the recommendation
made to Professor Hazard nine years later. 4
For example, under the common law, a binding agreement between the creditor and the principal debtor to extend the time of
payment automatically discharges the surety, without the need to
show loss or injury 55 This suretyship defense was incorporated, albeit awkwardly, into former section 3-606(1)(a) of the Uniform
Commercial Code as an agreement to "suspend the right to enforce

rather than delayed to a date letting in other encumbrances ahead of it, it
seems to me that prejudice must be assumed on these facts, as a matter of law,
on the basis of what defendant would have had the right to do at that time in
protection of his interests. I do not see how any facts plaintiff might conceivably adduce at a hearing could affect the validity of the foregoing observations.
Id. at 939 (Conford, J., concurring in part).
51. See supra text accompanying note 33; infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
52. The guarantor argued that the common law doctrine of stnctissimt juns, which afforded the surety a discharge without its having to prove actual prejudice, had not been
changed by former U.C.C. § 3-606, and that the doctrine was still viable under U.C.C. § 1103. The concurring judge in Langeveld adopted that position. See Langeveld, 376 A.2d at
938-39 (Conford, J., concurring in part).
53. Here, the phrase "pro tanto" is used. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 132 (1941)
(entitled "Surrender or Impairment of Security by Creditor"). According to Black's Law
Dictionary,this means "[flor so much; for as much as may be; as far as it goes." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1100 (5th ed. 1979).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
55. E.g., Bell v. Martin, 18 N.J.L. 167 (1840).
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against such person the instrument." 5 The phrase "to the extent" 57 in the statute is also applicable, but what possible meaning
can that phrase have in the context of an extension of time 9 If
there is an agreement "to suspend the right to enforce," the modifier "to the extent" seems meaningless. The New Jersey Supreme
Court apparently agreed and implied that the automatic discharge
afforded by the common law in the case of an extension continued
to be the rule under former section 3-606(1)(a) without any need
to prove prejudice.58 The court went on to say, however, that when
the surety seeks a discharge based on the suretyship defense of an
impairment of collateral, "a quite different situation is pre59
sented.

V

THE RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY

But how and why should there be a difference in the treatment
of these two suretyship defenses 9 Does it automatically follow that
an extension of time is inherently more prejudicial to a surety than
an impairment of collateral? Indeed, revised section 3-605 of the
Uniform Commercial Code rejects any such distinction and provides that the surety is entitled to a discharge for either an extension of time or impairment of collateral only "to the extent" of the
loss or "impairment of collateral."6 0 Sections 36 and 38 of the Restatement of Suretyship are in accord with that position."
The Restatement of Security made a valiant effort 'to create a
"golden thread" running through the various suretyship defenses
and the effect of those defenses upon the surety's right to discharge. The "thread," however, is often difficult to find and overly
complex. A distinction is drawn between a "compensated surety"
and "other sureties. ' 62 This distinction, however, is not completely
56. U.C.C. § 3-606(1)(a) (1978).
57. See id. § 3-606(1).
58. Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376 A.2d 931, 937 n.5 (N.J. 1977).
59. Id. This was a response to the concurring opinion which cited the "extension of time"
rule in support of its view that in the instant impairment-of-collateral case, the guarantor
had already proven prejudice and was entitled to a discharge without any remand. Id. at 939
(Conford, J., concurring in part); see supra note 50.
60. U.C.C. § 3-605(c), (e) (1990).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP §§ 36, 38 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993).
62. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 82 cmt. 1 (1941). Comment i defines "compensated
surety" as follows:
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satisfactory By limiting the definition of "compensated surety" to
those in the business of executing surety contracts for compensation called a premium, the definition excludes many sureties who
receive direct or indirect economic benefit"3 and, anomalously,
ends up grouping sureties who receive economic benefit with gratuitous sureties. 4
Although the Restatement of Security did not utilize this distinction with respect to the impairment of collateral defense,6 5 the
distinction is significant if the suretyship defense is based upon an
extension of time to the principal debtor. Under section 129 of the
Restatement of Security, the common law rule of absolute discharge is retained in the case of an uncompensated surety,6 6 but

The term "compensated surety" is used in the Restatement of this Subject
to mean a person who engages in the business of executing surety contracts for
a compensation called a premium, which is determined by a computation of
risks on an actuarial basis. Compensated sureties are generally incorporated.
Other sureties, whether strictly gratuitous or whether receiving some pecuniary
advantage, whose surety contracts are occasional and incidental to other business, are not included among compensated sureties.
It is important to distinguish between compensated and other sureties because the rules of suretyship, notably those relating to the defenses of the
surety, are not in all respects alike for the two classes. The basis for the distinction is that one engaged in the business of executing surety contracts can
be expected to have contemplated and taken account of, in the premium
charged, certain elements of risk which are not considered to have been assumed by other sureties.
Id.
63. Compare this definition with revised U.C.C. § 3-419, which defines an accommodation party as one who "signs the instrument for the purpose of incurring liability on the
instrument without being a direct beneficiary of the value given for the instrument." U.C.C.
§ 3-419(a). Comment 1 explains that even a sole stockholder of a corporation cosigning a
note is an accommodation party "if no part of the loan was paid to X or for X's direct
benefit." Id. § 3-419 cmt. 1.
64. This distinction, drawn by comment i to § 82 of the Restatement of Security, has
been criticized as not accurately reflecting the state of the common law of suretyship. See
Gary L. Monserud, Interested Sureties and the Restatement of Suretyship: An Argument
Against Tender Treatment, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 247, 253 (1992).
132.
66. But this is wholly undercut and there is no discharge if "the creditor in the extension
agreement reserves his rights against the surety." Id. § 129(1). The formalities of the reservation-of-rights doctrine are eliminated in U.C.C. § 3-605. See U.C.C. § 3-605 cmt. 3.
65. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §
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the compensated surety is "discharged only to the extent that [it]
' 67
is harmed by the extension.
Section 128 of the Restatement of Security, entitled "Modification of Principal's Duty,"6 s also uses the distinction between compensated and uncompensated sureties, but does so somewhat differently than in section 129. Here, the common law rule discharging a surety strictissimi juris for any modification is continued for all sureties except compensated sureties, but is relaxed
where "the modification is of a sort that can only be beneficial to
the surety," in which event the surety remains liable.6 9 This relaxation is not a matter of proof in the particular circumstance of a
transaction because "[t]he rule does not permit a speculation as to
whether the change may or may not have been to the non-compensated surety's advantage. It must be of the sort that by its very
nature, in no circumstances, can increase the risk of such a

surety "170
The rule is even more complex in the case of a compensated
surety There is a discharge "if the modification materially increases [the] risk," 71 but the compensated surety is not discharged
"if the risk is not materially increased, but [the] obligation is reduced to the extent of loss due to the modification. '7 In that circumstance, there needs to be a judicial determination based on the
particular facts as to whether the modification has materially increased the risk; if not, then the extent of loss due to the modification must be determined.7 3
VI.

SURETYSHIP UNDER REVISED

U.C.C.

ARTICLE

3

As this brief summary demonstrates, it is extremely difficult to
rationalize the different formulations in the Restatement of Security with respect to the impact of the various suretyship defenses

67. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 129(2). Note that "to the extent" isused in § 129 as
distinguished from "pro tanto" in § 132. Is there a difference? See supra text accompanying
notes 51-59.
68. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 128.
69. Id. § 128(a) & cmt. e.
70. Id. § 128 cmt. e.
71. Id. § 128(b)(i).
72. Id. § 128(b)(ii).
73. See id. § 128 cmt. f.
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upon the surety's right to a discharge. In large part, the difficulty
in formulating a rationally consistent rule stems from the fact that
creditors, sureties, and principal debtors inevitably have different
perspectives concerning the impact of the different events that give
rise to the suretyship defenses. These differences are reflective not
only of their parochial positions, but also of the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction. Thus, in revised Article 3, four
different treatments eventually emerged: 1) a release never discharges the surety;74 2) an extension discharges the surety only "to
the extent [the surety] proves that the extension caused loss"; 5 3)
material modification discharges the surety completely unless the
76
creditor "proves that no loss was caused by the modification";
and 4) impairment of collateral discharges the surety to the extent
'77
there is a reduction in the "value of an interest in the collateral.
In drafting the statute, the Drafting Committee discussed the differing perspectives of creditors, sureties, and principal debtors at
length, and the resulting variations were, in many respects, the
product of compromises the Committee made in order to accom78
modate these different views and perceptions.

74. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990). This rule has been criticized. See Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship
Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and Substantial Changes, 42 ALA. L. REV.
595, 606-13 (1991); Sarah H. Jenkins, Abrogation of Surety's Right of Discharge on Release
of the PrincipalObligor Under Revised Article 3: A Creditor's Tool for Maximizing SelfInterest, 44 OKLA.L. REV. 661 (1991). I am inclined to agree with these criticisms.
75. U.C.C. § 3-605(c).
76. Id. § 3-605(d).
77. Id. § 3-605(e).
78. The draft dated April 15, 1990 presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute on May 18, 1990 in Washington, D.C., treated an extension of the due date as a
material modification and provided for discharge of the surety unless the creditor proved
the absence of loss:
If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or without consideration, to a material modification of the obligation of a party to the instrument, including an extension of the due date, there is discharge of the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against
the person whose obligation is modified to the extent the modification causes
loss to the indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of recourse. The indorser or accommodation party is deemed to have suffered loss
as a result of the modification equal to the amount of the right of recourse
unless the person enforcing the instrument proves that no loss was caused by
the modification or that the loss caused by the modification was less than the
amount of the right of recourse.
U.C.C. § 3-605(c) (Proposed Final Draft, 1990).
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Although the formulations under revised Article 3 are more understandable and workable than those under the Restatement of
Security, the experience with the Article 3 revisions reaffirmed the
conclusion made with respect to the Restatement of Security during the Langeveld case: there was a compelling need to examine,
review, and restate the entire body of the law of suretyship.
VII.

REVISITING LANGEVELD UNDER REVISED

U.C.C.

ARTICLE

3

AND THE RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP

Langeveld whetted my appetite to delve more into the law of
suretyship. It was not easy Even though suretyship and guaranties
were an increasingly important area of commercial practice, particularly because of the myriad of recourse and "credit enhancement"
devices and structures accompanying the rapidly escalating volume
of credit extensions by financers, the bench and the bar were genAt that meeting, I moved that extensions receive different treatment from other material
modifications; the burden of proving loss arising from an extension should be placed upon
the surety, on the ground that granting extensions generally facilitates workouts and out-ofcourt compositions. Professor Cohen asked whether I wanted to amend the motion to cover
modifications also, but I declined in order not to change further the compromises arrived at
in the Drafting Committee. The motion was then passed and the subsection was split into
present U.C.C. § 3-605(c) and (d), reading as follows:
(c) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or without consideration, to an extension of the due date of the obligation of a party to pay
the instrument, the extension discharges an indorser or accommodation party
having a right of recourse against the party whose obligation is extended to the
extent the indorser or accommodation party proves that the extension caused
loss to the indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of
recourse.
(d) If a person entitled to enforce an instrument agrees, with or without consideration, to a material modification of the obligation of a party other than an
extension of the due date, the modification discharges the obligation of an indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against the person
whose obligation is modified to the extent the modification causes loss to the
indorser or accommodation party with respect to the right of recourse. The loss
suffered by the indorser or accommodation party as a result of the modification is equal to the amount of the right of recourse unless the person enforcing
the instrument proves that no loss was caused by the modification or that the
loss caused by the modification was an amount less than the amount of the
right of recourse.
U.C.C. § 3-605(c)-(d) (1990); see also Memorandum from Robert L. Jordan & William D.
Warren, Reporters to Drafting Committee, on Amendments to Uniform Commercial
Code-Current Payment Methods 18 (July 9, 1990) (on file with author) (reflecting these
changes in U.C.C. § 3-605(c)-(d)).
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erally ignorant on the subject. This ignorance, in large part, is attributable to the fact that suretyship has not been taught in law
schools since the 1950s. Commercial law curricula are essentially
structured around the Uniform Commercial Code and, except for
some incomplete treatment of accommodation parties to Article 3
negotiable instruments, 79 the Code gave scant treatment to suretyship.
As a result of increasing explorations of this area of the law, I
began to cover the subject more extensively in my courses at Columbia and New York University Law Schools and was frequently
asked to discuss the topic at continuing legal education programs
in the late 1970s and 1980s. It was during this time that I met
Professor Cohen, an outstanding scholar at Brooklyn Law School.
He evinced particular interest in the subject and, eventually, was
the logical choice to become the Reporter for the Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship. 0
The studies and analyses of suretyship that went first into the
revision of U.C.C. Article 3 and later into the Restatement of
Suretyship undoubtedly have afforded considerable clarity and insight into this difficult area."' If the issues in Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H.
Corp.2 were to arise today, their resolution would be much easier-particularly if the Restatement of Suretyship were accepted
as an accurate statement of modern common law

79. See U.C.C. §§ 3-408, -415, -416, -606 (1978); Ellen A. Peters, Suretyship Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 833 (1968).
80. Professor Gerald McLaughlin, then a colleague of Professor Cohen at Brooklyn Law
School and now Dean of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, was also at these education
programs. He is currently an Adviser to the Restatement. As a recognized authority on the
law of letters of credit, his presence, together with that of Professor John Dolan of Wayne
State Law School, another leading authority in this area, is particularly important because
of the sensitive issue of the relationship between suretyship and letters of credit, and the
need to distinguish the two bodies of law. For a more complete discussion, see JOHN F
DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT (2d ed. 1991). Section 3(2) of the Restatement of
Suretyship excludes letters of credit from the coverage of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 3(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
81. The other Advisers to the Restatement of Suretyship, all of whom have actively participated and contributed to its deliberations, are: Dean Phillip I. Blumberg of Hartford;
James F Crowder, Jr. of Miami; C. Allen Foster of Greensboro; Patrick J. O'Connor, Jr. of
Minneapolis; Professor Peter Winship of Dallas; and Robert A. Zadek of San Francisco.
82. 376 A.2d 931 (N.J. 1977).
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Inasmuch as revised U.C.C. Article 3 does not purport to be a
comprehensive statement of suretyship law,8" the resolution of
suretyship issues would still be accomplished by first applying the
applicable Article 3 provisions"' and then supplementing these
provisions with the common law as articulated in the Restatement
of Suretyship.8 5 Thus, it would be readily understood that in the
absence of a waiver of discharge under revised section 3-605(i) indicating either specifically, or by general language, that the "parties waive defenses based on suretyship or impairment of collateral,"" 6 the impairment-of-collateral defense would be available
'87
even though the guaranty is "absolute and unconditional.
There would be no difficulty in characterizing the suretyship defense as "impairing [the] value of an interest in collateral, ' 88 because that defense, by definition, includes "failure to obtain or
maintain perfection or recordation of the interest in collateral."8 9
It is also clear that the guarantor has the "burden of proving
impairment."" °
83. As of the writing of this Article, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has tentatively approved an amendment to the comment to U.C.C. § 3-605 to
this effect.
84., U.C.C. § 3-605 (1990).
85. See id. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity
shall supplement its provisions."). If a guaranty is in a separate
writing, Article 3 would be inapplicable and, absent a suretyship statute, common law rules
would govern. A court, of course, is not bound to apply the Restatement of Suretyship, but
hopefully would do so-particularly in light of the obscurity and antiquity of the common
law rules.
86. Id. § 3-605(i).
87. See id. This is explicitly stated in the Restatement of Suretyship: "A statement to
the effect that the duty of the secondary obligor is absolute or unconditional, however, is
ordinarily not specific enough to indicate that the secondary obligor is waiving discharges
based on suretyship status." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 42 cmt. d (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1993). Revised § 3-605(i) is somewhat broader in permitting the waiver to be in "general language indicating that parties waive defenses based on suretyship." U.C.C. § 3-605(i).
Langeveld, however, required language that "specifically frees the creditor from liability for
such impairment." Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376 A.2d 931, 935 (N.J. 1977); cf. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Douglas, 606 A.2d 684, 691-92 (Conn. 1992) (finding contractual waivers
specific enough to be valid).
88. U.C.C. § 3-605(g).
89. Id., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SuRETYsHIP § 38(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2).
90. U.C.C. § 3-605(e); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 43(2)(a)(i) (Tent. Draft
No. 2) (allocating the burden of persuasion to the surety if it receives a "business benefit").
This includes the indirect benefit arising from the surety's status as an owner or officer. Id.
§ 43 cmt. b.
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The manner in which impairment must be proven is specifically
defined in revised section 3-605(e):
The value of an interest in collateral is impaired to the extent (i)
the value of the interest is reduced to an amount less than the
amount of the right of recourse of the party asserting discharge,
or (ii) the reduction in value of the interest causes an increase in
the amount by which the amount of the right of recourse exceeds the value of the interest."
This formulation clearly rejects strictissmi juris and requires
proof of monetary loss as distinguished from proof of actual
92
prejudice per se as urged by the concurring judge in Langeveld
But does the formulation in revised U.C.C. Article 3 require that in
all cases the guarantor prove the impairment of the "value of an
interest in collateral" with mathematical certainty in terms of actual dollars? And at what point in time must the guarantor begin
measuring impairment? These, of course, were major issues in
Langeveld.e3
Revised section 3-605 speaks in terms of the suretyship defenses
being raised by a party having a right of recourse against the obligor.94 Comment 4 refers to the "right of recourse when default occurs. ' 95 This is consistent with Langeveld, which held that "the
time the obligation matured" was the time when the guarantor
"was entitled to exercise his rights as surety "9' The Restatement
of Suretyship is even more precise, making it clear that when the
duty of the surety is conditioned on default, it is the surety's per-

91. U.C.C. § 3-605(e). The definition is in two parts because of the necessity of covering
the circumstance in which the right of recourse was undersecured prior to the impairment.
This situation is reflected in the second part. Compare § 38 of the Restatement of Suretyship, which uses a multipurpose test applicable to all the suretyship defenses and covers
both circumstances: "[T]o the extent that such impairment would otherwise increase the
difference between the maximum amount recoverable by the secondary obligor pursuant to
its subrogation rights (§§ 23-27) and the value of the collateral." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP § 38(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2). The two tests have the same substantive import.
92. See Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 376 A.2d 931, 938 (N.J. 1977) (Conford, J., concurring in part); supra note 50.
93. See Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936.
94. See U.C.C. § 3-605(b)-(e).
95. Id. § 3-605 cmt. 4.
96. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936.
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formance upon that default that gives rise to the surety's right of
subrogation.97
Although revised section 3-605(e) measures impairment in terms
of "the extent of" a reduction in "value of an interest in collateral," 98 it should not follow that the reduction in value must be
translatable into actual dollars in a case involving facts such as
those in Langeveld. In essence, revised section 3-605(e) would determine "the extent of" impairment in the Langeveld scenario by
measuring (i) what the value of the right of recourse to the collateral would have been if there had not been a failure timely to record the mortgage so that it would have had a third-priority position against (ii) what that value was in fact as a result of the three
liens intervening and attaining priority 99 The guarantor would
have little difficulty in proving the first part of the measurement.
That value is simply the "equity" between the fair market value of
the property and the amount due on the first two mortgages at the
time of default on the third mortgage.
The second part is more problematic because it requires proof of
the genuineness, validity, and enforceability of the three intervening liens, and the amounts due and owing on those liens at the
time of default on the third mortgage. In Langeveld, these were
contested issues. 100 If it must prove the value of the three intervening liens in terms of actual dollars in order to prove impairment,
the guarantor will have an extremely difficult, if not impossible,
burden to meet. Revised section 3-605(e), which does not speak to
that specific issue, should not be interpreted as imposing that bur-

97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 23 cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993); Id. § 38
cmt. g ("Accordingly, the value [of the collateral] should not be determined as of a time
before the time for performance of the secondary obligation, because that is the earliest
time at which the secondary obligor could acquire subrogation rights."); see also id. § 36
cmt. i (explaining the rule that permits a surety to perform its obligation in accordance with
the original schedule despite the creditor's grant of an extension of time to the principal
obligor: "It would be inequitable for the principal obligor and the obligee to have the power
to change the terms of that obligation without the consent of the secondary obligor.
[Tihe secondary obligor may always discharge its obligation by performing the secondary
obligation as originally agreed.").
98. U.C.C. § 3-605(e).
99. See id.
100. Langeveld, 376 A.2d at 936.
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den. Instead, the statute should be supplemented via section 1-103
with the principle enunciated in Langeveld:
But there are factual situations-this may or may not be one of
them-where a surety may be able to establish that he has sustained prejudice but be unable to measure the extent of the
prejudice in terms of monetary loss. Where such a situation is
presented the surety will normally be completely discharged. 101
This principle, however, should be subject to the added caveat that
the obligee ought to have the right to prevent or reduce the discharge by proving that the actual amount of prejudice was not the
full amount claimed by the intervening liens. This concept is ex10 2
pressed in the Restatement of Suretyship.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Section 1-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that its
underlying purposes and policies are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
10 3
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
By and large the U.C.C. has achieved those goals. Ironically, however, that achievement has had exactly the opposite effect with respect to the law of suretyship, which has "fallen between the
cracks" in the last forty years. The move to reverse that trend has
been long overdue, particularly because of the ever-increasing importance of suretyship in commercial law and practice.
The revision of U.C.C. Article 3, with its attendant focus on its
suretyship provisions, was an important first step. The Restatement of Suretyship is of major importance, not only because of its

101. Id. at 937.
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 43(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993); id. § 43 cmt.
d; id. § 43 reporter's note, cmt. d (referring to Langeveld). It may well be appropriate for
the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code also to articulate this concept for U.C.C. § 3-605 in a Board commentary.
103. U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
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scholarly excellence, but because of its emphasis upon pragmatic
issues that are of concern to the commercial world.
Progress must not end, however, with the Restatement of Suretyship. Despite its excellence, it is not "the law," but only persuasive authority for the bench and bar. The goal should be to codify
the law of suretyship in a new Article of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Restatement provides a sound basis for that codification.
In addition, commercial law curricula in the law schools must be
revised to give attention to suretyship law so that new lawyers
coming onto the scene will no longer be ignorant of this critically
important and vital area of commercial practice. The Restatement
of Suretyship will facilitate that process.
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May 30, 1986

Prof. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
Yale Law School
New Haven, CT 06520
Re:

Suretyship

Dear Geoff:
This letter is for the purpose of recommending an ALI study of the law
of suretyship with a view to (1) having a Restatement of the Law of Security 2d
and (2) reviewing and expanding the suretyship rules in the Uniform Commercial
Code - possibly in a new Article.
The Restatement of Security was ordered published by the Council at
its May 6-9, 1941, meeting. Professor John Hanna was the Reporter. It
consists of two Divisions: Pledges and Suretyship. Although a pledge is
obviously a form of security and is now covered by UCC Articles 8 and 9,
suretyship was also "included in the general field of Security because the
obligation of a surety is an additional assurance to the one entitled to the
performance of an act that the act will be performed." (Scope Note to Division
II, Suretyship p. 225.) It may well be that a new Restatement need only deal
with suretyship and be name "Restatement of Suretyship"
At the present time, suretyship rules are essentially in the common
law, although some states have comprehensive statutory schemes, e.g.
California. There are some suretyship rules in the Uniform Commercial Code,
but they are spasmodically stated and, in some cases, not even identified as
suretyship provisions. The UCC provisions are 3-415 (Contract of Accommodation
Party), 3-416 (Contract of Guarantor), and 3-606 (Impairment of Recourse or of
Collateral); and 3-408 (Consideration) has a tangential impact. I am certain
that other provisions scattered throughout the UCC also affect sureties.
As Chief Justice (then Professor) Peters has observed:
"Interestingly, the institution of suretyship has so far escaped the
elaborate statutory regulation which has attended collateral security
devices. The Uniform Commercial Code goes further toward setting
operative guidelines than has ever been done before, but even the
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bond, insofar as it includes in its boilerplate an assignment of
The informal
contract rights, may or may not fall within Article 9
surety arrangement is left to the mercy of local interpretation of
local Statutes of Frauds. But Article 3 purports to take on, in a
manner less superficial than that of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which it replaces, the rights and obligations of sureties who appear
on short term commercial paper.

What emerges, then, as the principal weakness of the code's Article 3
sections dealing with suretyship obligations is not so much the
absence of definitive solutions but the failure to establish any
consistent pattern of legislative intervention. At some points, the
sections dictate with fanatical and misguided precision what the
suretyship obligation may or may not contain. At other junctures, the
sections contain entirely unguided references to large bodies of
perhaps inapplicable local law. Only rarely does the Code specify for
the parties and the courts those degrees of freedom which the Code
decided, correctly to preserve." (Footnotes omitted; Peters, Suretyship Under 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Yale L.J 833, 835,
879 (1968)
This dichotomy between the common law and the UCC produces some
anomalies. If an obligation is guarantied by an endorsement of an Article 3
promissory note, the Article 3 provisions govern. But, if the same obligation
is guarantied by a separate guaranty agreement, the common law rules are
applicable. Strange to say, some courts and lawyers apparently do not even
know of the common law of suretyship. In Halprin v Frankenberser, 644 P.2d
452, 34 UCC Rep. 189 (Kan. 1982), the supreme Court of Kansas held that the
impairment of collateral defense was not available to a continuing guaranty
because Article 3 was not applicable, without recognizing that the defense is
also set forth in Restatement of Security §132.
Unfortunately the analaguous rules in the Restatement and UCC are
sometimes differently stated and, in some cases, substantively different. For
example, 3-606 covers the suretyship defenses in subsection (a) of alteration
of the underlying debt and in subsection (b) of impairment of collateral.
These defenses are covered in Restatement of Security §§128 and 129, and §132,
Are these defenses absolute or must actual prejudice be shown?
respectively
3-606 speaks in terms of a discharge of "any party to the instrument to the
Restatement of Security §§128 and 129, however, apply the
extent ***"
strictissimi Juris principle and provide for complete discharges (except for
compensated sureties), which §132 states that the surety's obligation is
reduced pro tanto *** " These differences are not readily reconcilable.
As another example, the common law rule requires new consideration for
a suretyship agreement given after the obligee has already extended value.
Official Comment 3 to 3-415 says that 3-415(2) changes this rule and that the
surety is liable "even though there is no extension of time or other compensation." However, I find little, if anything, in 3-415(2) supporting the
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Conclusion that this important common law has clearly been changed. See also
Steffen & Johns, The After-Acquired Surety- Commercial Paper, 59 Calif. L.
Rev 1459 (1971).
There is also the very current controversy as to whether a surety can
waive the Article 9 defenses of lack of Notice and failure to conduct a
commercially reasonable foreclosure sale. Compare McEntire v Indiana Nat.
Bank, 471 N.E. 2d. 1216, 39 UCC Rep. 1804 (Ind. App. 1984) and U.S. v. Lang,
621 F Supp. 1182, 42 UCC Rep. 34 (D. Vt. 1985) waiver precluded under
9-105(1)(d) and 9-501(3)(b)) with U.S. v Lattauzio, 748 F 2d 559, 39 UCC Rep.
1799 (10th Cir. 1984) and Rutan v. Summit Sports, Inc., 173 Cal. App. 3d 965,
42 UCC Rep. 342 (1985) (upholding waivers under general suretyship
principles.) As you know, this particular issue is covered by one of our
proposed PEB commentaries.
Suretyship is, of course, very important to the practice and business
of commercial law. In addition to the traditional uses of guaranties and
endorsements, there are a multitude of other recourse arrangements which bring
into play the suretyship rules, e.g. repurchase and contingent reserve agreements. Great reliance is placed on the enforceability of these obligations.
In addition, new kinds of commercial arrangements are evolving which
involve the use of suretyship concepts. The marketability of corporate
commercial paper and governmental bonds is furthered by the backing by of
highly-rated financial or insurance institutions through the use of "credit
enhancement facilities"
These facilities are sometimes structured as either
insurance or financial guaranty bonds or standby letters of credit or
irrevocable commitments to lend. Although essentially serving the same
purpose, different bodies of law (with sometimes dramatically different
results) will be applicable. Consider the ongoing controversy about the
differences between standby letters of credit and guaranties. Or, try and
determine which body of law is applicable to a financial guaranty bond issued
by an insurance company - insurance or suretyship? My point is that the
contemplated study should also consider these other bodies of law and, in doing
so, analyze whether they should also be encompassed under the general rubric of
suretyship or whether the applicability of different concepts based on
different labels or structuring of documents, is really justified.
Notwithstanding the importance to the commercial world of-these
suretyship and related doctrines, these subjects receive scant attention in the
law schools. As a consequence, the practising bar and judiciary encounter
these concepts with increasing ignorance. This was not the case 30 years ago.
Hanna's Cases and Materials on Security, (2d ed. 1952) contained 201 pages of
tightly compacted and comprehensive material on suretyship. On the other hand,
Farnsworth and Honnold, Cases and Materials on Commercial Law, (3 ed. 1984)
(which is probably the best of today's casebooks) contains 38 pages and Baird
and Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Security Interests in Personal
Property, (1st ed. 1984) contains only 18 pages.
The problem is that commercial law has become so complex that survey
courses are necessary and only a limited number of courses or seminars focus on
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Commercial law in-depth - and then only on the most vital subjects such as
sales, secured transactions, bankruptcy and the like. As a result, suretyship
is only covered tangentially and in very little detail.
Under these circumstances, it is wholly appropriate, after 45 years to
reexamine the suretyship principles set forth in the Restatement of Security;
to examine anew the relationship and applicability of the related concepts
governing insurance, standby letters of credit, credit enhancement facilities
and the like; and to make the Uniform Commercial Code as complete and
consistent therewith as feasible.
It seems evident that a study of suretyship and the related doctrines
would not only be a great practical importance and interest to the practising
bar and judiciary, but also be intellectually stimulating and challenging to
For these reasons, it strikes me that the recommended
the academic community
project is ideal for favorable consideration by the American Law Institute.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely,

Donlid J
DJR:MLH
cc:

Paul Wolkin, Esq.
Martin Aronstein, Esq.

Rapson
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APPENDIX B
May 30, 1989
Why a Restatement of Suretyship is Needed
by Donald J. Rapson
1. As all forms of financing, commercial and consumer, expand,
both in volume and in format, there is an increased risk with a
correlative need for additional credit support from third persons. The commercial world often uses the term "credit enhancement" These take various forms, traditional and innovative, e.g..
a.

Accommodation parties to promissory notes and other instruments, negotiable and non-negotiable.
b. Guaranty Agreements.
c. Recourse (full and limited) Agreements.
d. Hypothecation (non-recourse) Agreements.
e. Vendor Subsidization Agreements.
f. Financial Guaranty Bonds.
g. Credit Insurance.
h. Standby Letters of Credit (sometimes referred to as guaranty letters of credit).
2. At the same time that the importance and use of third party
credit supports (hereafter "suretyship") has been increasing,
substantive knowledge of the subject among the bench and bar
has been decreasing. This is attributable to a number of factors:
a.

Suretyship has not been taught in American Law Schools
since the mid-1950's, or, if taught at all, at most for an
hour or two in a negotiable instruments (UCC Article 3)
course. With the advent of the UCC, commercial law
courses were structured upon the content of the UCC,
which only treats suretyship sketchily, e.g. UCC 3-415,
3-416, 3-606; and those few provisions only cover a limited
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class of sureties, viz. accommodation signers of instruments covered by Article 3.
Textual treatment of suretyship is generally obsolete. The
Restatement of Security, which covers suretyship in Division II, was published in 1941. Professor Hanna, who was
the Reporter, furnished an up-date in his Casebook on Security (2d Ed. 1952), which allots 201 pages to the subject.
In contrast, recent casebooks give little attention to the
subject, e.g.. Farnsworth and Honnold (3d Ed. 1984) - 38
pages; Baird and Jackson (1st Ed. 1984) - 18 pages; Jordan & Warren (1st Ed. 1983) - 19 pages. The most recent
treatises are Arant, Suretyship and Guaranty (1931);
Stearns, Suretyship (4th Ed. 1934), and Simpson on Suretyship (1950). Williston on Contracts (3d Ed. 1967) contains a lengthy chapter on suretyship and guaranty (10
Williston on Contracts §§ 1211-1284A), but this chapter is
essentially an up-date of earlier editions. The recent treatise by Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups, (1985)
deals extensively with corporate guaranties (pp. 285-362),
but is essentially focused on corporate and fraudulent convenyence law
As a consequence, the law of suretyship has, in most jurisdictions, become an obscur6 part of the common law Only
a few states have comprehensive statutory treatment, e.g.
Calif. Civ Code §§ 2785-2855. Inasmuch as all jurisdictions have enacted UCC Article 3, there are often conflicts
and inconsistencies between the UCC provisions (albeit
sketchy) and the applicable common or statutory law.

The relationships to and distinctions among suretyship devices
and between other bodies of law and concepts is not clear.
Consider the following questions:
a.

b.

At one time and even today in some jurisdictions, there
has been a purported distinction between suretyship and
guaranty Does this distinction make sense and, if so, does
it have any present relevance 9
What is the difference, if any, between suretyship and insurance 9 It has been said that suretyship involves a threeparty relationship, viz. surety, principal and creditor in-
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volving a common obligor, whereas insurance is a twoparty contractual relationship that is independent of the
insured's obligation. Are differing bodies of law applicable? Insurance is highly regulated, but are these regulatory considerations applicable to suretyship 9 Where does
a financial guaranty bond fit in this structure 9 If the factoring of accounts receivable is viewed as the equivalent of
credit insurance, where does it fit? Consider Restatement
of Security §117, Comment d.
(d) The surety, if he desires, may assume a risk
greater than that which would be implied
from a mere guaranteeing of the principal's
performance. The surety may contract not
only as a surety but also as an insurer, that
is, that he will indemnify the creditor against
loss, irrespective of the continuance or even
of the existence of a duty on the part of the
principal. Such a contract may be stated in
specific terms or it may be implied from
terms used, interpreted in the light of the
circumstances. (underlining supplied)
c.

d.

Are there different classes of suretyship for which there
should be differing treatment? Restatement of Security §
82, Comment 1 distinguished between compensated and
other sureties. Is this a useful or even a recognized distinction in the cases? What is the difference between a compensated surety and an insurer 9 If there is economic benefit to the surety, does it become a compensated surety9 If
the surety is an "insider", e.g. a principal or affiliate company, should that be a separate class? Should there be a
difference between the rules for commercial and consumer
sureties? If there are meaningful class distinctions to be
drawn, what should they be and what legal consequences
should flow from those distinctions?
Standby-letters of credit (S/L/C/) present a special
problem. The traditional view is that these are not
suretyship documents, but are governed by a discrete
body of law, viz. UCC Article 5 and the Uniform
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Customs and Practice for Documentary Transactions
(UCP). Consider the following statement:
"A letter of credit always serves as a guaranty
This does not mean that it is a guaranty A letter of credit is an identical twin to a guaranty
but the fact that the two things look alike and
may be used for the same purpose and are difficult to distinguish from the other, does not
mean that there are not differences which,
however subtle, are of major importance."
Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit,
48 Cornell L.Q. 92, 93 (1962).
S/L/C/ have also been recognized as the functional
equivalents of insurance and the recent Federal Reserve
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines refer to a "financial guarantee standby letter of credit" (12 CFR Part 208, Appendix A).
Although there may well be compelling reasons for maintaining the dichotomy between suretyship and letter of
credit law, might it be appropriate to apply certain aspects of the former to the latter without impairing the distinctiveness of the SL/C, e.g. the right of subrogation? Cf.
In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc., 48 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985) with In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 89 B.R. 150 (Bankr.
D. Col. 1988).
4.

Suretyship, being a hoary and distinctive body of law,
contains a number of concepts which probably should be reanalyzed and evaluated:
a.

The traditional suretyship defenses of (1) impairment of
collateral and (2) alteration of the underlying debt are
based on the proposition that the surety is entitled to special protection and anything that changes its- obligation
should result in its discharge under strictissimi juris. The
more recent view is that the surety should only be discharged to the extent it has been prejudiced. Cf. Restatement of Security § 122 with § 128.
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Notwithstanding the imperative nature of the suretyship
defenses, the doctrine of "reservation of rights" anomalously permits the surety to agree with the principal to alter the debt and at the same time to unilaterally and without notice reserve its rights against the surety Does this
continue to make sense? Cf. Restatement of Security §
122, Comment d.
There is a well-established tradition of the surety being
able to waive the suretyship defenses. Does a guaranty
that explicitly states that it is "absolute and unconditional" effect such a waiver 9 There is a split of authority
with most recent cases holding that "absolute and unconditional" is insufficient and that the waiver must be more
specific and expressly refer to the precise defense being
waived.
Notwithstanding the general perception that suretyship
is a contractual relationship governed by the terms of
the contract and that waivers are broadly enforceable,
there exists today a major deviation with respect to the
enforceability of a waiver by the surety of notice of
foreclosure of a security interest and the defense of
commercial reasonableness under UCC Article 9. This
issue has engendered much litigation with the majority
of cases holding that such waivers are unenforceable,
although there is a significant dissenting view. If the
surety can effectively agree to being sued directly
without prior resort to the collateral, why shouldn't the
surety's waivers with respect to foreclosure of the
collateral be enforceable?
This issue of the enforceability of suretyship waivers has
recently arisen in a new context, i.e. vicarious preference
liability under Bankruptcy Code §§ 547 and 550(a) because of the existence of "an insider guaranty" See In re
V.N. Deprizio Construction Co., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.
1989). As a consequence of that decision, lenders will endeavor to resolve the problem by eliminating the guarantor's contingent status as a "creditor" of the principal by
having the guarantor waive its right of "subrogation, reimbursement, compensation, contribution and the like" Will
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that waiver be enforceable or deemed inimical to the
bankruptcy policy against preferences?
f.

Although the general rule is that the consideration supporting the obligation of the principal supports the obligation of the surety and that separate, independent consideration is not needed to support the surety's obligation,
there is confusion as to whether separate consideration is
needed to hold the surety when it becomes liable after the
original obligation was incurred. The historic rule required
new consideration, but UCC 3-408 and 3-415 purport to
change the rule. See Comment 3 to 3-415. Should the rule
be broadly changed? What would suffice as new consideration? Should it be a quantitative test?

5. Although suretyship certainly arises out of an express contract,
it is essentially a relationship concept that can also be implied
from factual situations. See Restatement of Security § 82,
Comment h, §83. The consequence is that the special rights,
duties and obligations of suretyship law then become applicable. There may be a need to consider whether the suretyship
relation and the resulting obligations can also arise in other situations, not heretofore considered under suretyship, particularly in view of the development of different and complex commercial transactions. For example:
a.

A participation agreement does, in certain circumstances,
impose duties upon the lead with respect to the participant, e.g. the lead assures the participant that its losses
will not exceed a stipulated level. Some courts and commentators have taken the position that those duties are of
a fiduciary nature. Is there any correlation between such
fiduciary duties and suretyship 9

b.

What is the distinction between guaranty and warranty?
If a party makes certain warranties with respect to the obligations or performance of another, is that party a surety
entitled to the special rights and protection afforded that
status9 For example, where one lender sells a portfolio of
receivables to another lender, or there is a securitization
of that portfolio, do the warranties made by the seller
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with respect to the receivables entitle it to the rights of a
surety9
The so-called "comfort letter" is an attempt by a parent
or affiliate company to give assurances to a creditor of the
debtor company that will fall short, however, of imposing
suretyship liability Where is the bright line? What legal
efficacy, if any, is there to these comfort letters? Should
the law impose legal consequences on the issuance of such
documents, especially where there is intended to be some
detrimental reliance by the creditor 9
Historically and increasingly at present, there have been
equitable doctrines imposing duties upon senior lienholders with respect to the rights of junior lienholders, e.g.
marshaling, liability for releases of collateral which operate to the detriment of the junior, etc. Is there a relationship between those duties and the duties of a creditor to a
surety, such as the rules against impairment of collateral
and alteration of the underlying debt?

Conclusion:
After 48 years it is wholly appropriate to reexamine suretyship
principles, including those set forth in the Restatement of Security, and to examine anew the relationships and applicability of
those principles to the new and complex commercial transactions
that have since developed and to related bodies of law and analogous concepts and doctrines.

